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This paper studies the risk taking behavior of Indonesian Banking Industry, especially before and 
after the establishment and the implementation of Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC).Using common 
set of explanatory variables; we test several empirical models to reveal the conduct of risk management 
by banks. In the spirit of BASEL II Accord, this paper take closer look at three types of risk behaviors 
namely credit risk, market or interest rate risk and operational risk, prior and post the establishment of 
IDIC. We tested the hypotheses using panel data set of banks operational in period of2000-2009. The 
dataset consists of 121 banks with semiannual frequency (2420 observations). Our findings show that 
these variables explain well the three type bank risk exposures. The implementation of IDIC alters the bank 
behavior albeit in somewhat different way than initially hypothesized. The risk taking responses also varies 
across bank types. We found that State Owned Enterprise banks (SOE)behave differently relative to the 
rest types of the bank. Related to size, SOE banks behave more conservative after the implementation of 
IDIC. On the other hand its response on conditioned capital post the IDIC implementation is the opposite; 
they became more aggressive. We view the public pressure on this state banks has influenced the way 
they manage the risk.
abstract
Keywords : Risk taking behavior, BASEL II, Deposit Insurance.
JEL Classification: G11, G21, G32, C23
1 Authors are lecturer s at Faculty of Economics and Business, Ma Chung University, Malang. They can be contacted by email at 
mochammad.ariefianto@lps.go.id or soenartomo.soepomo@machung.ac.id.
4 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, January 2013
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent theory of banking includes risk management as core function of banks (Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008). The function takes a central attention especially in a volatile and fast changing 
today environment. Ideal management objective not only aims at maximizing return subject to 
resources constraint butalso reasonablerisk. 
It is a well-established preposition that in the event of asymmetric information, bank 
managers and or shareholders preferred higher risk portfolio in the expectation of larger 
return. The situation is worsened when public guarantee for third party funds exists (explicit or 
implicitly). The latter introduced the moral hazard problem. 
To overcome the problem, many authorities create a deposit insurance scheme in place of 
public guarantee. The mechanism may vary, nevertheless in essence it is the banks themselves 
that raise the funds to back up possibility of bank rush. This scheme is quite old. US Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation was established in 1933 as a response to Great Depression.
Indonesia created Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC) in September 2005. Its creation 
was proposed after 1998 crisis revealed major weakness in banking system. With the absent of 
deposit insurance institution, the government has to bail out the failing banks (or even illiquid 
banks). The fiscal cost was enormous in which estimation ranged around IDR. 600 Trillion (More 
than USD 60 billions).
Learning from the grim consequences, it is decided a semi public institution should handle 
the safety of funds and deal with the problems of bank liquidity and solvency. IDIC charges a 
flat rate of 0.01% based on monthly average deposits. Deposits coverage insured according to 
current law is maximum Rp. 2 Billions and must comply with deposits remuneration rule.
It remains to see whether the establishment of IDIC is effective in preserving public 
confidence to banks. Nevertheless it must be admitted that IDIC creation is a pivotal point in 
history of Indonesian banking industry. The largest challenge to date faced by IDIC is the bail 
out of Bank Century. In the midst of 2008 global crisis, this small commercial bank failed due to 
weak financial standing. Under the order of Financial System Stability committee, IDIC carried 
out the bail out of Bank Century whose cost around Rp. 6.7 Trillion (USD 750 Million).
The role of risk management is increasingly important, especially in current volatile business 
environment. Sub Prime Mortgage lost in US which subsequently followed by global crisis has 
shown that risk management in financial institution is still not adequate. The refinement known 
as Basel III proposal looks for stricter risk practices and higher capital as risk buffer.
Even though the issue is of paramount important, interestingly there are not many 
empirical searches exploring the issue especially for the case of emerging countries. In this 
regards we hope that this study would contribute a significant value not only for scientific 
purpose but also for policy making and regulation. 
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In this paper we take a closer look on how banks in Indonesia practices risk management. 
Specifically we focus on practices between pre and post IDIC establishment. Although there are 
various risks inherent in banking operations but here we investigate 3 major types namely credit 
risk, market risk and operation risk2. Initially we aim to reveal market risk that stems from foreign 
exchange and interest rate movement. Nevertheless we find the data to be non-supportive for 
observation in foreign exchange risk taking. Around 58 banks (48% of the sample) are classified 
as Non Foreign Exchange Banks and Regional Banks. In these types of banks, foreign exchange 
business is either trivial or nonexistent. Therefore we are focusing more on appropriate class 
of market risk, that is interest rate risk but still maintaining the notion (that is market risk and 
interest rate risk are used interchangeably). 
We establish empirical scheme in testing relationship between these measures of risk 
with various factors (shareholders drive, competition, firm size, capital, charter value and 
macroeconomic condition). The aims of this paper first are to identify factors influencing 
bank risk taking behavior (credit, market and operational risk), second to reveal the pattern of 
relationship and possible changes related to establishment of IDIC. Further more we attempt 
to uncover various form of relationship according to types (BI categories), and third to elicit 
practical and policy implications based on study results.
The next section present a brief account on IDIC as one of key turning points in Indonesian 
banking and also present the recent theories and empirical works in risk management. The third 
section discusses the methodology and the data, including the robustness check of the model, 
while the fourth section presents the result and analysis. Conclusion and policy implicationis 
presented on the last section.
II. THEORY
2.1. Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Deposits insurance is introduced mostly to evade the disastrous effect of bank panics (Freixas 
and Rochet, 2008). The scheme gives guarantee to public that deposits could still be withdrawn 
in the event of bank failure. In an explicit insurance scheme, a premium is usually paid and there 
are several requirements for deposits withdrawal3. The scheme could be run by either a private 
company, semipublic or government agency. In an implicit insurance, the public sees the scheme 
as automatic and as a part of procedure to recover confidence to banking system. 
The first Deposit Insurance was created in United States as a response to Great Depression. 
Today, according to International Association of Deposits Insurance (IADI) there are 95 countries 
2 See Apostolik et al (2009) and Saunders and Cornett (2003) for an excellent text book on various risk inherent in financial firms 
and banks.
3  This could be in form of maximum withdrawal, characteristic of coverage (types of product, maximum interest rate, nominal amount, 
etc) and procedure.
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that have deposits insurance (explicit or implicit). This is more than 60% of existing countries. 
There are various features of deposits insurance from coverage, characteristics of risk premium, 
existence of co-insurance and funding. Kunt et al (2005) studied and documented these features 
(see table 1).
Most deposits insurance corporations (DIC) are jointly funded (63%). Around 36% are 
privately capitalized and only 1% that is pure public funded. Interestingly even though most 
DIC’s are jointly financed, most of them are administered by the state (60%). Around 27% 
are jointly operated and only 12% are pure private administration. It seems that government 























































In a theoretical work, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that Deposits Insurance 
could provide a solution to bank runs or bank panics. Nevertheless its implementation is not 
without problem. Freixas and Rochet (2008) elicit three important aspects related to Deposits 
Insurance. They are (1) moral hazard Issue; (2) risk based pricing and (3) incomplete information 
problems.
Moral hazard problem arise from weakening incentive of depositors to monitor the banks 
and increasing risk taking behavior of the manager and shareholder. Deposits insurance works 
as a put option in part of depositors, and a call option in the view of shareholders. The problems 
are especially important if the risk premium is not fairly priced: flat or inadequate risk adjusted 
premium (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007).
Merton (1977) considers deposits insurance as identical to put option of bank assets at 
strike price of amount of deposits. He postulates that actuarially fair rate of deposits insurance 
is an increasing function of deposits to asset ratio and volatility of bank assets. This important 
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work has been expanded to various ways; two important works are Pennachi (1987) which 
includes resolution of bank failure and Acharya and Dreyfus (1988) which considers possibility 
of authority takes over the bank before it is really insolvent. 
Chan et al (1997) shows that within incomplete information environment, the fairly 
priced deposit insurance may not be feasible. This is mainly due to (1) timing problems of lag 
in policy implementation and (2) adverse selection: private market for insurance premium is 
ceased to exist.
Exposition above shows that the impact of Deposits Insurance to bank behavior might not 
be so clear. Flat rate might induce more risk taking behavior, however the impact to equilibrium 
level of deposits and loans margin might diverge (Suarez, 1993). Gennote and Pyle (1991) 
show that bank might underinvest in loan when bank capital is raised. More recent study by 
Matutes and Vives (2000) shows that competition might become fiercer with the introduction 
of deposit insurance, and lead to higher probability of failure.  
2.2. A Review on Risk Taking Behavior
There are many risk types to consider in bank management. However under spirit of Basel II, 
generic classes of bank risk could be categorized as credit, market and operational risk. Credit 
risk could be defined as probabilities that one or more component of bank portfolio experience 
a default (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Credit risk could be further classified into individual risk 
and portfolio risk (Saunders and Cornett, 2003). Individual risk could be measured by standard 
credit analysis procedure famous as 5C jargon: Capital, Condition, Capacity, Collateral and 
Character (Apostolik et al, 2009). On the other hand portfolio risk mainly rises from degree of 
concentration and correlation (lack of diversification).
Theoretically a loan could be depicted as a complete contingent contract that specify in 
every state of nature and interim date of the following conditions (Freixas and Rochet, 2008):
a. The amount of repayment
b. The interest rate on the remaining debt 
c. A possible adjustment in the collateral required by the lender
d. The actions to be undertaken by the borrower 
The basic model of lender-borrower first developed by Wilson (1968) hinges on symmetric 
information assumption. Under this assumption, the sensitivity of repayment rate as a function 
of firm operation is high when the borrower is more risk averse than the lender (and vice versa).
This model has been improved in two important ways. 
One development is the work of Townend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) in which 
they relaxed the assumption into asymmetric information. Lender bears significant cost to 
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reveal the exact nature of borrower business (called state verification). Under this more realistic 
assumption, lenders should develop incentive compatible contracts. There could be many 
contracts that have this property thus the next task for the lender is to pick up the most efficient 
one. An efficient incentive compatible contract is obtained by maximizing the probability of an 
audit for a fixed expected repayment amount or maximizing expected repayment for a fixed 
probability of an audit. If both agents are risk neutral, any efficient incentive compatible debt 
contract is a standard debt contract.
The other is introducing a possibility of moral hazard after the loan is granted. Innes 
(1990) is the most cited work in the area. Assuming the limited liability of the borrower 
and individual rationality constraints, a model is developed to shape the optimal repayment 
function. The model also assume the monotone likelihood ratio property (Holmstrom, 1979), 
in which business result is an appropriate signal of effort.  It is shown that the correct incentive 
compatible repayment scheme is function of effort. The borrower is imposed penalty if the 
observed result is lower than a particular threshold (obtained via solution to lender return 
maximizing problem). The borrower is given reward in form of zero additional repayment if 
his effort exceeds the threshold. 
There are several other variants and combination works from these two major strains. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) construct a model in which borrower’s investment is not verifiable. 
Jappeli et al (2005) propose a model in which borrower could dispute the lender’s claim in 
court. Hart and Moore (1994) stress an important fact that the contract cannot impose on the 
borrower any restriction on the freedom of walk away. Myers and Rajan offer a model under 
condition of possible asset substitution opportunities. These models show that different result 
could be obtained in the lender-borrower relationship. 
Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffe (1974) are the first theoretical works that give birth to 
market risk meaning. They view bank as a portfolio manager which obtained funds in various 
form and tenor then invest them into assets. They regard loans which are inherently non tradable 
as tradable securities. These securities are valued using a risk free rate asdiscount factor.  
At a point of time, bank could be in an open position. They have mismatches in deposits 
versus loan characteristics (especially in tenor and currency denomination). With regard to interest 
rate, Hart and Jaffe (1974) show that as long as risk free interest rate remains between deposits 
and lending rate then bank has position in loan (securities) and deposits are positive.
Practically market risk could be measure as return variability of a trading portfolio (Saunders 
and Cornett, 2003). This variability could result from changes in interest rate and exchange 
rate. There are three types of calculating market risk that commonly used: Risk Metrics4, historic 
simulation and Monte Carlo.
4 This instrument was first introduced by JP Morgan, see www.jpmorganchase.com for technical documents. Risk metrics was further 
developed and currently famous as Value at Risk. In a nutshell, this concept describe what is the extent of the loses if the day turn 
out to be a bad day.  
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Basel committee (2001) defined operational risk as potential loss (both direct and indirect) 
due to failure or inadequate internal system. This class of risk includes among other system 
failure, reputational risk, fraud and strategic risk.
Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) develop an interesting theoretical work on aggregate risk 
positioning by banks which depends on various conditions. There are two critical aspects in their 
theorem: (1) strategic interaction among three important parties: deposit insurance, shareholder 
and manager and (2) four types risk profile which are more realistic than strict mean variance 
ordering that usually assumed in typical studies5.
They show that with mean-variance ordering profile: high risk high return, three important 
parties in banking industry would have positive preference for risky assets. Shareholders are 
the highest, followed by management and deposit insurance respectively.
Saunders et al (1990) investigate empirically the relationship of ownership and bank risk 
taking. Using a panel dataset consist of 38 US banks at annual frequency during 1978-1985 
period, they tested whether stockholder controlled banks have greater incentives to take risk 
than managerially controlled bank. They experiment with seven capital market risk sensitivity 
measures (derived by Capital Asset Pricing Model).In their study they find evidence in support 
of the hypotheses: stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior 
than managerially controlled.
Risk taking incentive may change before commencement of a business plan (ex ante) 
and after (ex-post). This possibilityis studied by Galloway et al (1997) using database of 86 US 
banks, at daily frequency during 1977-1994 periods. They use a market based risk measure, 
annual standard deviation of weekly equity return and several explanation variables (charter 
value, market to book value, capital, and operating leverage among others). They find that 
charter value correlates negatively with risk taking measures. 
A more recent study conducted by Marco and Fernandez (2007) on relationship of risk 
taking behavior on ownership structure and size of entities. They use two risk proxies: risk of 
failure (a Z score) and level of exposure to insolvency (inspired by Value at Risk paradigm). The 
data are an unbalanced panel consists of 256 Commercial and Savings banks in Spain from 
1993 to 2000 at annual frequency (total 1030 observations). Using control variables like return 
on equity, lending to asset ratio and dummy of size and dynamic panel data econometrics they 
find evidence that risk proxies are inversely related to size. They also find that commercial banks 
are more risk inclined than the Savings banks. 
Our approach in this study is different in several way from previous works outlined above. 
First we are comprehensive. We include almost all commercial banks operational in Indonesia in 
post crisis era. Second, we use simple (accounting) risk measures against common set explanatory 
5 Mean and variance are characteristics of distribution (also known as the first and second moments). Like a scalar, distribution could 
also be compared using concept of stochastic dominance. For an introduction to this topic, please see Davidson (2006).  
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variables to verify the relationship hypotheses. Third we take account on the impact of IDIC 
implementation on risk taking behavior. Last, we also view possibilities of interactions among 
different types of banks (using BI categories). 
III. METHODOLOGY
This study aims to reveal the risk taking behavior of the bank (credit, market and operational 
risk) against common set of independent variables (bank characteristics, competition and 
macro economy). We use panel dataset from published financial report. Dataset comprises 
of commercial banks operating during 2000 to 2009 (121 banks) with semiannual frequency. 
There are 2420 observations in the dataset6.
A linear model was used as empirical scheme to test relationships between risk taking 
and independent variables. Mathematically it could be expressed in the following form
6 Risks measures are missing or unavailable in several banks especially in early period. Therefore actually we work on unbalanced 
panel data. The degree of severity of imbalance is different among regressions (credit, market and operational risk). 
Sit = α0 + αi Xi + εit (1)
where Sit  is a vector of risk taking variables (credit, market and operational) and Xis vector 
of independent variables. The scheme comprises of 3 risk taking variables and 11independent 
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Examination of pre and post IDIC establishment risk behavior is conducted using dummy 
event variables (notation: IDIC). These categorical variables are used both to signify level effect 
and behavior shift (interaction term with independent variables). The behavioral shift is assumed 
only occur to internal characteristics variables. If this regulatory institution works effectively we 
could expect that all variables are smaller in absolute size (i.e. the dummy event variables would 
take an opposite numerical value).
The empirical scheme will also explore the possible effect on greater detail. Here we 
will direct our focus on different impact due to types. We use Bank Indonesia (Central Bank) 
categories and generate dummy variable called TYPE. The categories are State Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) Banks, Regional Development Bank, Private Foreign Exchange Bank, Private Non Foreign 
Exchange Bank and Foreign Owned-Joint Venture Bank. The notations are 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
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7  There are many variants of panel data estimators. We use somewhat standard techniques that are quite popular in usage. Further 
exposition on this topic could be obtained from Baltagi (2005) and Cameron and Triverdi (2008).   
We use 3 econometric techniques to obtain the estimates7. They are Panel Estimated 
Generalized Least Squares (EGLS), Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE). Apriory we don’t 
know the exact pattern of error component. They could be pooled residual, fixed or random 
between observations. Here we only take assumption of possible difference between cross 
section units not period. This is one way error component that can be either fixed or random. 
Error type could also not include into these classifications, therefore we still maintain pooled 
estimation with heteroscedasticity robust property (EGLS).
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents estimation results on various econometrics specification and notes on 
their robustness (diagnostic test). First we would convey the regression result applied to all data 
(without including the effect of IDIC implementation). In the next sub section, we will present 
the impact of IDIC implementation. First we will see its general impact and then explore in 
greater detail i.e. affect by bank types.
4.1. Overall Behavior Result
Table 3 shows the result of all sample credit risk taking regression. Credit risk as proxied by 
ratio of non performing loan to allowance is regressed to various explanation variables. Here 
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First aligned with Saunders et al (1997), we find (credit) risk taking to be negatively 
affected by bank size. Larger banks tend to be more conservative. The coefficients are the 
largest among other estimators, ranging from -9.3 (EGLS) to -33.74 (RE). Since these are semi 
elasticities, 1% increased of size (ceteris paribus) would decrease credit risk taking position 9.3% 
to 33.74%. We also find competition to be negatively influence (credit) risk taking behavior 
(EGLS and FE) as suggested by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). Last we also find Capital to be in 
line with existing literature since it could go both ways. Our findings then are closer to those 
of Keeley and Furlong (1990).
Contrary to previous studies and intuition, we find that variables of ROE, personnel cost 
ratio (HRP), and Growth as non-increasing with risk. Contrary to theoretical result of Jeitschko 
and Jeung (2005), higher value of ROE does not seem to correlate with aggressive risk taking. We 
think large portion of government bonds and left over effect of 1997 great crisis has tempered 
management risk appetite while at the same time provide decent return. Indonesian banking 
industry is dominated by large banks (with share more than 70%) that are recapitalized after 
the crisis. These would affect the estimation result. The same argument could be said to explain 
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Here we also find the strongest impact of the bank size to theirrisk taking behavior (see 
Table 4). The magnitude of the coefficients is ranged from -1.09 to -31.71 (the largest of all 
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estimates). An increase in 1% of bank size, on average would reduce the loan to deposit ratio 
by 1.09% to 31.7%. For this market risk type, the role of capital is closer to the one proposed 
by Jeitschko and Jeung (2005). More capital would likely to induce greater interest rate exposure 
(through higher LDR). With regards to competition, our findings are closer to that of Keeley 
(1990). More competition would induce aggressive (interest rate) risk taking.
We find non supportive (and mixed) evidence regarding the role of ROE, HRP and growth 
to interest rate risk taking. ROE and HRP have a small albeit negative effect to LDR while growth 
estimates are not significant in all techniques used. Again we suggest the left over impact of 
crisis and recapitalization program should help explain this occurrence. 
One interesting additional findings are on DIVER variables. DIVER that measures the 
extent banks operate beyond their traditional intermediation role prove to be risk reducing. It 
seems that diversification activities taken by banks are detached to intermediation function. 
Indeed casual observation shows that in last decade other business unrelated to traditional 
role is flourishing. These activities include among others bank assurance, electronic-internet 
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Last, the evidences from operational risk are also in line with Saunders et al (1997). Here 
larger banks are associated with less operational risk taking. The magnitude is considerable 
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convergent and lower than the other two risk types. 1% increase in size (ceteris paribus) would 
reduce ratio of fixed asset to total asset by 1.71% to 2.29%. The role of capital and competition 
is small although significant and in line with Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) and Keleey (1990).
In addition to estimating parameters, we also perform testing on choosing the appropriate 
model8. First we conduct Redundant Fixed Effect test (Log likelihood ratio) to test whether the 
Fixed Effect model (FEM) is suitable. The results strongly conforms the use of this model. The 
null hypotheses of (jointly) zero fixed cross section effect are strongly rejected. The F statistics 
are 3.58, 3.05 and 4.41 for credit, interest rate and operational risk respectively. Next, we take 
the analog test for random effect specification (The Hausman Test). Here the null hypotheses of 
(jointly) no random effect could not be rejected statistically. Taken together both specification 
tests would conclude that Fixed Effect Model is more superior in estimating the relationship of 
risk taking behavior to various factors. Based on this result, we decide to use FE technique in 
further exploration. 
4.2. The Impact of IDIC
Overall Bank Result
Overall regressions show that implementation of IDIC alters the risk taking behavior of banks 
(see table 6). First we review the credit risk taking behavior. The constant term is increased by 
93 points. It would suggest inherently, banks are more aggressive in taking exposure in credit. 
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This evidence contradicts the maintain hypotheses that implementation of IDIC would reduce 
risk taking drive. We can use the low loan exposures during the first half of the decade to 
explain this anomaly. After recapitalization, banks are usually reluctant to extend the credit 
since it might deteriorate their capital position that has just beingrecovered.
However things might change once the IDIC was implemented in 2005. Coupled with 
low realization, the implementation could be seen as a boost to lending activities. As Suarez 
(1993) first put it, the deposit insurance work to reduce the cost of deposit, the most important 
input to lending and in the same time increase the value of loan to banks. Both can increase 
the risk exposure of loan, which is proxied with the ratio of non-performing loan to bad debt 
allowance.
Further evidence on this hypotheses is given by positive and significant of IDIC*CAP 
interaction term. A one percent increase in capital would result in 2.1 percent more credit risk 
exposure post IDIC implementation. The credit risk taking behavior increases as the banks have 
higher charter value (this is contrast to the work of Marchus, 1984).
On the other hand, the implementation of IDIC does not have a direct effect on the interest 
rate risk taking behavior. The estimated coefficient of IDIC, which should alter the constant, is 
not significant though the sign is negative as expected. However, the implementation of the IDC 
has an indirect affect through personnel incentive (HRP) and the capital (CAP). A one percent 
increase of personnel incentive will increase the interest rate risk taking behavior of 0.455, while 
the capital works in the opposite effect of -0.748 (See column 4 on Table 6).
Operational risk is the only measure that in line with hypotheses. The impact of IDIC 
implementation is negative and significant (-0.852). Nevertheless most explanatory variables 
are either very small or statistically insignificant. 
Aligned with above findings, banks size is negatively correlated with risk taking position. 
Nevertheless related to IDIC implementation, the impacts are diverged. Larger banks are 
becoming even more reluctant to extend their credit risk position than the smaller ones after 
IDIC event. One percent increase in size would result in 4.56 percent reductionin credit risk 
compared to pre IDIC implementation. The interaction of IDIC and the size impacts are either 
not significant and/or very small for interest rate risk and operational risk.
Controlling the Bank’s Type 
The responseson IDIC implementation differ markedly across types of banks. We use the State 
Owned (SOE) Banks as baseline category. To have the net effect of each category, we subtract 
the baseline coefficient to interaction term9. The algebraic sign is sufficient to show when 
9 For example the net impact of size to credit risk taking for Private Foreign Exchange Bank Category is 11.871 that is obtained from 
-45.862+57.733.  
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particular type of bank behavesmore conservative or more aggressive relative to our benchmark 
banks (SOE banks).
Table 7 present the estimation result for the risk taking behavior using the credit risk 
proxy. ROE and SIZE are two variables that make the SOE banks to behave more conservative 
after the implementation of IDIC. We address the explanation of ROE impacton SOE banks to 
the benefit of recapitalization program as previously stated. Nevertheless the positive sign on 
Private Foreign Exchange bank and Foreign-Joint Venture category indicates the managerial 
drives to a more aggressive risk taking behavior, which is widely observed in practice. 
As explained earlier from Table 6, larger SOE banks tend to choose less risk. Surprisingly, 
the other types of bank move on the opposite. The Regional and the Private Foreign Exchange 
Bank respond differently when their size increases. For every 1 percent increase in size after 
the IDIC implementation, both will increase their exposure on credit risk in the magnitude (net 
effect) of 5.427 and 11.871 respectively.
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On the other hand, the increase of capital after the IDIC implementation intensifies the 
credit risk taking behavior in SOE banks. For every one percent capital increase, the SOE banks 
increase their credit risk exposure by 13.73 percent, after the implementation of IDIC. Other 
types of bank response less aggressive or turn out to be aggressive. On average, due to the 
capital increase, the other bank types are less aggressive by less than a quarter relative to the 
SOE responses. The response is even negative for Foreign-Joint Venture banks, showing it 
becomes conservative.Credit risk position response to both HRP and Charter Value does not 
significantly differ across types of banks. This is in line with the overall regression.
18 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, January 2013
The next proxy for risk is interest rate and is termed as market risk (See Table 8). There is 
little evidence that the response of market or interest rate risk differs across banks types. From 
Table 8, the bank market risk response differs on only two variables; first is HRP influence on 
Private Non Foreign Exchange Bank and the other is Size on Foreign-Joint Venture banks. After 
the implementation of IDIC, the HRP increase the market risk exposure in Private Non Foreign 
Exchange Bank more than the other bank types. The same effect applies for variable Size in 
Foreign-Joint Venture banks.
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Table 9 shows the estimation result for operational risk. We find different response of 
operational risk between the SOE banks and other bank types. Related to the size of the bank 
(Size), SOE banks tend to reduce operational risk by 0.406 for every one percentincrease of size 
after the implementation of IDIC. Contrary to this, the other types of banks raise their operational 
risk exposure, where the coefficient of interaction term (IDIC*Size) for non-government bank 
is larger in absolute than the SOE banks. After the implementation of IDIC, as the size of the 
bank increase, the most conservative positive response belongs to regional banks, while the 
most aggressive on is private non foreign exchange. 
Related to the capital, after the implementation of IDIC the SOE banks tend to increase 
their operational risk as their capital increase. For every one percent increase in capital, the SOE 
banks raise their operational risk exposure by 0.282 percent. On the other hand, the other bank 
types only increase their risk exposure by less than one tenth compared to the SOE response. 
Their response is quite uniform, where their operational risk position on increase by 0.003 after 
the implementation of IDIC. The rest of variables: ROE, HRP and CV, do not exhibit different 
impact across bank types.
Comparison Summary
Overall view on credit, market and operational risk proxies shows that the SOE banks behave 
distinctively compared to other bank types. The SOE bankis the most heavily recapitalized one, 
therefore is closely monitored by various stakeholders10. The larger the bank, the more conservative 
they will be, and it explain the negative correlation between the risk measure and the bank size. 
For non-government bank the situation is different. Though also were being recapitalized but 
they have been sold during the period of 2000-2003, hence are “free” from public control. 
Moreover, the regional bank, the private non foreign exchange and the foreign-joint venture 
bank are either small or mostly was self-sustained (not recapitalized by government). 
Nevertheless due to recapitalization, most SOE banks tended to be too conservative. They 
are more reluctant to involve in real business activities, there fore they have too low risk exposure. 
Observing this condition, the public put a pressure on these banks to be more aggressive and to 
contribute to the business-real sector development11. The implementation of IDIC enforces this 
trend, since it is perceived as implicit guarantee, and is in line with the theory. 
The other bank types work on a more sustainable and stable basis. They are free from public 
pressure and could adhere to their long term business plan without short term discretionary. A 
particular case is for the foreign-joint venture bank, which become more conservative on taking 
the credit risk.
10 We should note that in addition to huge economic restructuring, Indonesia is also undergoing a transition to democratic country. 
Public monitor and participation are rising significantly and various groups in the society are putting high interest on how government 
spend the money (and also the public corporations performance). 
11  Indeed, popular anecdotes are people sees SOE banks management as living on public money. They earn revenue from government 
bonds that share large portion in the banks book. These bonds many giving coupon that significantly exceed deposits interest rate.  
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V. CONCLUSION
For Indonesia, the pivotal point in banking regulation is the implementation of Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (IDIC). The majority of literature both theoretical and empirical suggests that the 
IDIC event should reduce the incentive to take the risk. The empirical test on this paper provides 
us several findings. First, most cases show that risk taking behavior is negatively correlated 
with the size of the bank. Larger bank tends to be more risk averse than the smaller bank. 
Second, the implementation of IDIC alter the risk taking behavior, but some what different 
from initial hypothesis. Excluding the interaction terms, the implementation of IDIC tends to 
raise the credit risk taking. Third, the implementation of IDIC tends to reduce the operational 
risk taking, which is aligned with the hypotheses. Fourth, the influence of size is significantly 
less pronounced post IDIC implementation. By controlling the bank types, the result shows 
that the government bank (SOE) tends to reduce risk as its size increases; and this is the fifth 
finding. Sixth, the SOE bank also tends to raise risk exposure as its capital increases, while for 
the other bank types is the opposite. 
These findings have several policy implications. First, the IDIC implementation tends to 
increase the risk taking behavior; and this is a sign of moral hazard as suspected by Freixas and 
Rochet (2008). The moral hazard in this situation most likely is due to the flat rate insurance 
premium (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007). To evade the problems, IDIC should consider using 
a fairer premium, which based on the risk (risk-based premium). Second, larger banks seem to 
have self-control mechanism relating to risk since they reduce risk position as their size increase. 
This finding highlights the importance of bank consolidation through Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A), and the authority should provide proper incentive for this. To preserve the competition 
and to maintain the contes table banking market, Bank Indonesia can open the door for new 
comer to take over the existing banks. Third, the bank excluding SOE banks tend to be more 
conservative to take risk as capital increase. Since this real phenomenon may arise as the form 
of capital preservation, the authority should emphasize the importance of capital along with 
the undergoing implementation of Basel III. 
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